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SPACE APPLICATIONS - ANOTHER WINGMAN
Introduction

"The quality and quantity of information
comprehended per unit of time may now determine
who wins or loses a sales order or a war."
Tom Peters
We justifiably pride ourselves as a nation on our military
capabilities, especially since our recent success in Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. However, it is very possible that in the mid-90f s the Federal
Express truck driver will have better situation awareness and global
connectivity than a fighter pilot.
As not only the Air Force, but the other military services look into
the future, it is clear that we will all have to take the maximum advantage
of both our newer technologies as well as existing capabilities to leverage
costs and systems which can contribute to improved military performance
on the battlefield.
This paper suggests some ways in which Air Force Space Command,
working with other Air Force major commands, will increase the war
fighter's comfort level with .-- and ability to employ -- space systems.
Space systems have been around for about thirty years, but their potential
contributions to the "trigger puller" at the unit level are just beginning to
be investigated and exploited by the operator. A reasonable comparison of
how the Air Force air breathing flying community and the space flying
community have done business in the past might be the left and right
hemispheres of the brain, both "doing their own thing" with very little
connecting tissue (corpus colossum) tying them together.
In order to convey the potential of space to support combat flight
operations, it might be helpful to think of space systems as another
"wingman" in the flight. A good supporting wingman provides mutual
support, contributes to better situation awareness, and adds to the
firepower potential of the flight. Space systems appear to have the ability
to perform well as a "supporting wingman." Information output, force
structure size and diversity, and predictability are real pluses for space
system wingman support. In addition, connectivity can be enhanced
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throughout all levels of command, from the flight lead to the Joint Force
Commander.
The clear vision of Air Force senior leaders is to effectively integrate
space capabilities into global reach, global power objectives. Air Force
Space Command established an office in August, 1990, manned with a
cross-section of highly experienced aircrews from all the major commands
who are experts in the major weapons systems, along with engineers and
space specialists. The Space Applications Division charter is to work
closely with operational flying commands as well as with the various space
communities to investigate, assess, and demonstrate the capabilities of
space systems and their potential to support the operational missions of
the Air Force. Since all Services have flying assets, the experiments
conducted by the Air Force could be applied to other Services' flying
programs as well.
Desert Shield/Desert Storm provided the first operationally relevant
benchmark for space support to large-scale military operations over a
sustained period. It never quite achieved "wingman" status for the
operator, despite Herculean attempts by all who provided support to the
war. Much of what was accomplished evolved over a period of some
months before becoming operationally usable. Within the Air Force, a
great deal of potential could not be converted to operational utility, since
we lacked sufficient end user equipment, especially at the wing
operational level, to exploit existing capabilities. Recent testimony from
senior military leaders regarding Desert Shield/Desert Storm support and
outcome, shows that much remains to be done to make good on the
potential for support to the war fighter. The results of Desert
Shield/Desert Storm provided an excellent stimulus to find ways of doing
the job better, from both flight operations and space applications
perspectives. A place to start would be to improve the awareness of both
communities about each others' capabilities, limitations, and requirements.
The emphasis should be focused to provide tactical information
including weather, communications, navigation, and inputs to improved
situation awareness and targeting data at the unit level, preferably in the
cockpit. By approaching the problem from a bottom-up perspective, it
might be possible to adequately address not only the aircrew needs, but in
the process satisfy the wing, air component, and possibly theater level
requirements as well. The traditional top-down approach has done
reasonably well at the highest levels of military command, but has not
necessarily met the requirements of the trigger puller, especially regarding
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issues of timeliness and accuracy of information at the tactical level of
operations.
Even recent Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recommendations
reinforce the idea that we should concentrate on the unit level
that is, at
brigade and wing operational levels
and that space capabilities should
therefore be investigated from the point of view that their capabilities,
when, properly exploited, comprise another tactically supportive wingman.

Wingman

Potential

Today, space systems are information systems. The two general
kinds of information of great worth to a war fighter are those which
contribute to situation awareness and to achieving a targeting solution for
weapons delivery.
1. Situation Awareness. There are many different definitions of
this concept, and here's another one which will help frame the following
discussions about making space real to the operator. (As can be seen, by
substituting different words, the definition could also be applied to the
business world as well). Situation awareness is knowledge of the mission
(product), environment (business climate), threat (competitors), and target
(customer) along with knowledge about changes in the above factors in
time to make a difference, and to use that knowledge to retain the
strategic/tactical advantages of the plan.
2. Targeting Quality Information. Information of sufficiently
fine granularity to successfully plan and execute the strategy. Includes
accurate pre-conflict deliberate planning with prioritized information
exchange requirements suitable for immediate implementation upon
execution; pre-mission planning information just prior to mission
execution; penetration/enroute information; and, finally, detqjled
information about the target and surrounding area.
One of the most important capabilities of a wingman is to be in the
briefed position, when and where required. Kepler dictates the availability
of space systems, and therefore they can be used to rendezvous with a
large air package, just like other aircraft coming from widely separated
bases do. By planning Time Over Target (TOT) and other timing factors to
take advantage of space system availability, the strike force commander
can improve his overall ability to successfully carry out his plan of attack.
However, this requires that the planners responsible for generating the Air
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Tasking Order (ATO) be aware of the availability times of various space
systems.
Communications connectivity is another very important wingman
requirement, and is the key to successfully integrating space systems into
the cockpit. This allows the "wingman" to impart knowledge of the tactical
situation, provide warning of threats not generated by the leader's onboard sensors, and pass information from other support units which will
contribute to successful mission accomplishment. There is a valid concern
that task saturation can occur with too much information coming into the
cockpit. By bringing in the operators early on, and experimenting in
realistic tactical situations with the types and amounts of information per
unit time we prevent the "fire hose" effect. By allowing receiver filtering
of information, the pilot can plan his mission, set filters before takeoff, and
then get what he wants, when he wants it during his mission profile. The
man-machine interface factors for helping determine the acceptability of
information have been progressing very well ever since the F-15 reintroduced the single-seat fighter concept to the Air Force. The real
challenge is to integrate space-derived information in an easily digestible
way which complements information from on-board sensors and other
familiar information sources.
Space and the New Weapon Systems
A natural affinity exists between air power and space power. The
kinds of information and update rates, coupled with predictability, global
coverage, and communications connectivity make space systems very
attractive to the operator as he looks for improvements in his employment
capabilities. These capabilities exist today, and must be examined for their
value added and operational utility at all levels of command. Draft Air
Force Program Guidance for this year states the following:
"As the department of Defense focuses on what each
service does best, the unique characteristics of
airpower -- speed, stealth, range/reach, flexibility,
precision, and lethality
will be at a premium."
"...Investment priorities will focus on capabilities or
platforms representing core combat capabilities of our
aerospace force into the next century. We should
increase efforts to evaluate our investment programs,
implement lower cost acquisition strategies, and
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ensure greater program stability to maximize combat
capability."
The new weapons and weapon delivery systems under development
today are becoming larger and larger consumers of higher and higher
quality information delivered in less and less time. Statements of Need
(SONs) and other formal documentation already on the books for numerous
systems just being fielded, clearly show a need for support from off-board
systems. In order to make good on the promise of ideas like adverse
weather, autonomous, stand-off precision weapons, excellent connectivity
between the sensor and the shooter needs to exist. The connectivity must
be available during pre-mission planning, enroute to the target, and at the
weapon delivery point.
In the past,, technology constraints, security policy, and timeline
requirements for top-level (National Command Authorities and theater
commanders) assessments and planning dictated an "operational tempo"
that was not driven by rapidly evolving tactical changes on the battlefield.
Requirements for some space system tasking, collection, and information
dissemination were sized to support strategic, deliberate technical analysis.
Support timelines were measured in days, and performed well for the
activities that were supported at a time when the principal emphasis was
on the ability to respond effectively at the strategic level of conflict.
The

Changing Environment

The current world economic and military environment is extremely
dynamic. It remains to be seen whether the Russian Republics will stay
the course with their experiments in greater freedom, with the
accompanying wrenching changes in their culture, society, economy, and
military. While strategic capabilities must be retained at a reasonable
level vis a vis nuclear capabilities, we need to address the potential
contribution of space systems to theater tactical, and low-intensity conflict
as well.
U.S. forces are becoming smaller, lighter, and more expeditionary,
based in CONUS and rapidly deploying worldwide to respond to crisis
situations. Due to the increasing sophistication of possible adversaries,
these lighter forces must be able to bring firepower to bear in a decisive,
efficient way. Lift assets must provide smaller, more capable support
packages which can be easily set up, transported, and used in adverse
weather environments.
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The SASC recently addressed this concern with this observation:
"A variety of ongoing DOD programs provide terminals
to tactical forces to receive, process, and display
critical...data. The committee is concerned, however,
that these systems are not being deployed widely
enough or are too large to deploy easily in
contingencies...."
End user terminals which require huge lift budgets for mobility will
not compete favorably with beans and bullets when we try to deploy
rapidly to a contingency. Additionally, these large processing units require
large numbers of support personnel. Besides eating lift, these personnel
increase the signature of deployed forces, and provide additional targets of
opportunity for hostile action. A better situation would be to develop
systems which can fit into the mobility kits of the war fighting units, leave
labor intensive functions in CONUS, and use global connectivity devices to
pass information to a smaller, lighter, less vulnerable deployed force.
A good example of how Air Force Space Command and Air Force
Systems Command were able to solve the problem of large size quickly
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm involves the Mark IV van which
receives and processes the downlink from the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP). Through a program called "High Gear," Systems
Command was able to retain the capabilities of the Mark IV van but shrink
them from a C-130 load into a suite of equipment that, even with its
packing cases, fits nicely in the back of a HUMMV. We need to do more
along these lines with all end user terminals which receive/process spacederived information.
The trend in military operations worldwide is toward a technically
more capable threat able to mask its intentions better, resulting in highly
compressed decision, and response times, both in the cockpit and at
command levels.
Recalling the Air Force Draft Program Guidance, we need to examine
all available capabilities to improve our ability to operate at high closure
rates and over large geographic areas that characterize air operations. Our
C4I systems have to match the speed and area coverage potential of the air
domain; that is, speeds from 200 - 800 knots and combat radius of about
1000 nautical miles (nm).
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Our current airbreathing Service-organic sensors (E-3A, J-STARS,
Rivet Joint, etc.) are limited to about 300nm line-of-sight. On the night of
16 Jan 91, the distance travelled by F-117s, F-15s, and other aircraft from
the Saudi political border to Baghdad was approximately 600nm. The
question is: who was watching the store and providing support to the
aircrews for the last 300nm to the target?
How to Get There from Here
We need to expand the ability of space systems from the traditional
C4I/mission planning functions into the mission execution functions. Space
systems can indeed provide global situation awareness for the war fighters
when they have penetrated beyond organic service sensors. To achieve a
higher degree of operational utility involves reducing timelines for sensor
tasking, collection and information dissemination.
Ongoing efforts to streamline and speed up information collection,
analysis and dissemination will emphasize use of expert system processing
for those functions which need them. It leads both the space and
operational communities to a detailed discussion and examination of the .
utility of space systems with on-board processing capabilities and direct
downlinks as well as centralized processing. In addition, war fighters need
to evaluate additional alternatives such as satellite direct downlink to
theater processors like those developed by the Army Space Program Office
for support to the Corps Commander.
Where timelines can be reduced by eliminating intermediate
handlers and middlemen, we can improve information flow to the trigger
puller all the way up the chain to the theater commander. The objective is
to improve all space systems' ability to process and provide the most
timely data to all levels of command. That way operators can access
information required to execute the ATO, the air component commander
can access information to build the ATO, and the theater commander can
access information to enhance the theater operational level of planning.
This must be done in a way that still allows information access to other
users as well. Detailed analysis, data base development and the other
laborious tasks which form the baseline by which we can effectively
employ military force must be equally well served in the future.
We must examine ways in which our existing space capabilities can
be leveraged to provide cost savings in avionics development and design
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for new aircraft and weapons systems (off-board complements to on-board
sensors). At approximately $2000 per pound, any savings realized on
avionics, when multiplied by large procurement numbers, can add up to
significant cost savings.
Experiment with new ideas and capabilities. Few, if any, in either
the space community as a whole or in the operational war fighting
community can state conclusively what the bounds of the possible are with
respect to operational utility and value added of space in the cockpit. We
can establish the envelope by investing very small resources in useroriented demonstrations and experiments which put space capabilities in
the hands of the operator, allow him to exercise and train with them,
assess these capabilities with simulation and analytical tools, and ensure
that both the space and the operator communities become more aware of
each other.
With the objective of making space real for the operator, HQ
AFSPACECOM established the Space Applications Division in August, 1990.
Manned by experts from all the major Air Force commands and their
weapons systems as well as with engineers and space personnel, the office
is chartered to work with both the aircrews and with the space
communities. Since the office's beginning coincided with Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, interest in how space systems performed in the war
has been integral to the office's efforts. Part of the office's charter is to be
the Air Force executive agent for a Congressionally mandated program
known as Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP).
TENCAP is an activity that all Services pursue with varying levels of
success and funding. Both war fighters and Congress noted the impressive
leveraging capabilities of TENCAP where the military was able to generate
additional value added from the nation's investment in high-cost space
systems. By developing simple, low-cost user terminals, improving
communications connectivity, and educating operational users on the
capabilities inherent in the systems, the TENCAP organizations were able to
contribute some of the most valuable information systems in the Gulf.
While the capabilities by our nation's space systems are impressive,
they are not unique from a support standpoint. They fit well-established
concepts developed over the history or air warfare. Doctrinally and
procedurally, these capabilities should fit into existing roles and missions
of the Air Force as articulated in AFM 1-1, MCM 3-1, and in theater
Operations Plans (OPlans).
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In particular, operational planning has not addressed the capabilities
of space to support the commander or his subordinates. There is a specific
space support annex. (Annex N) identified for providing required
information on space capabilities in support of the plan. Generally, the
Annex N is very skimpy on detail, or non-existent. Recently, the Air
Component Command of US Forces Korea was the first Air Force
organization to develop a detailed space support annex to OPlan 5027. By
developing the plan, the command was able to improve its knowledge
about space systems as well as identify operational shortfalls. Those
shortfalls can be used to initiate formal requirements to improve various
combat functions by adding space-derived capabilities to in-theater
capabilities. Additionally, this gives the theater a good baseline from
which to exercise space systems in support of the OPlan, thereby giving the
operators greater insight into the support available from overhead.
Of equal importance to the planning process is the need to get
hardware and prototype systems into the hands of the operator. There are
several ongoing projects designed to explore and investigate integrating
off-board sensor information into the cockpit, to examine more efficient
ways to provide warning data on tactical ballistic missile launches, to bring
space capabilities into the new Theater Battle Management initiative
chaired by Air Combat Command. Also, a simulation facility is being
developed to assess the value added of space systems to theater level war
fighting, and education efforts are ongoing throughout the USAF.

Space Applications Division Projects
The first priority of the office is to get space hardware and
capabilities in the hands of the operators, preferably in the cockpit. To
that end, we have begun a project known as Talon Sword which takes
advantage of the ongoing interest in Real Time Information to the Cockpit
(RTIC) by the tactical air forces. Talon Sword builds on the "Fastball" F-16
work done by Air Warfare Center in trying to fuse various information
inputs and then pass them into the cockpit and display them in a timely
fashion to the pilot. This study will focus on tactically useful information
which will be assessed principally in terms of its utility in improving
situation awareness. The Navy will participate with an EA-6B equipped
with a Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) suite aboard. However, an adjunct
to the demonstration will be to explore the ability to provide targeting
quality information to a stand-off, precision weapon.
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One of the most important aspects of all demonstrations is to
adequately provide communications connectivity to all participants. The
office will provide suitcase-sized UHF satellite communications hardware
along with small SHF transceivers to support exercises in the Far East,
within CONUS, and in Europe. Successful use of SATCOM will free
commanders from having to depend exclusively on heavy, static landlinespecific communications architectures, and will allow a much higher level
of mobility, flexibility, and throughput.
Once the hardware is in the hands of the operators, exercising and
training with it is vital. The Space Applications Division works with other
service TENCAP organizations and air components to integrate space
capabilities efficiently into large-scale theater efforts as well as daily
training. In Korea, exercise Cope Jade will provide an opportunity for the
air component commander to exercise its newly developed space support
plans. The upcoming JCS Special Project 93 will also examine the utility of
space systems from a unified command theater standpoint. The Army is
lead on Questor Grail, part of a continuing series of tests to improve the
timeliness and accuracy of tactical ballistic missile warning data to air
defense units.
The adage that "you fight like you've trained, so train like you'll
fight" was proven once again in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Any operator
who has been in combat knows that unless he/she has trained with a
capability and is proficient in using it, a promised capability which only
appears when the first bullet goes by the windscreen will not be used
effectively. It will probably be dispensed along with the chaff and flares.
That is why the emphasis on training and exercising with our nation's
space systems needs to be conducted all the way down to brigade and
wing operational levels. The good news is that many valuable capabilities
can become available with changes to procedures, philosophies, and
policies.
Air Force Space Command is actively participating in the Theater
Battle Management initiative by integrating space-based capabilities into
the emerging C4I architectures being developed to support the war fighter
at all levels of command. The efficiencies achievable by using the global
connectivity offered by SATCOM will contribute greatly to the stated
objectives in the Air Force Program Guidance.
One of the areas that needs rigorous examination is the explicit
modeling of space systems support to theater level warfare. While there
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are numerous tools at all levels of fidelity and aggregation to examine
theater war, and a similar number of excellent space analytical tools, a
need exists to tie the two together with specifically developed Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs) to assess the value added of space to war fighting
from an analytical standpoint. The office has begun a modest effort to
attempt that feat. We will not conduct comparative evaluations of the
various space systems; that is not our charter. But we can provide an
operationally relevant viewpoint about how space systems might
contribute.
The Challenge:

Focus the Vision

The paradigm shifts that have occurred in world affairs also greatly
affect the military. The emerging third world countries with access to
highly sophisticated military hardware, coupled with our current budget
constraints, rapidly advancing technologies, and the continuous search for
greater efficiencies dictate that all of this country's capabilities be
examined carefully for their potential contribution to support military
operations. The issue is not whether we should have a military, but rather
how well we can focus military power in a timely, effective fashion when,
where and at the level of force necessary to successfully carry out national
policy. However, in order to make good on the promise space systems
hold, both operational war fighters and the space community as a whole
must re-think the way we have done business for the last thirty years.
New national strategies directed at regional contingencies being fought
with a CONUS-based, small, lethal expeditionary force structure will
demand highly responsive space system support.
We must avoid becoming mesmerized by technology for technology's
sake. Operational requirements need to drive how we spend our next
dollar within the space community. In an austere budget environment,
clear strategy-to-task-to-force structure methodologies must direct our
ideas and R&D efforts. The space communities need to be attentive to the
emerging C4I initiatives like the Navy's Copernicus and the Air Force's
Theater Battle Management, and build new capabilities that are
interoperable with military systems.
To summarize, there is a fantastic opportunity for the U.S. military to
greatly improve its capability to operate effectively in a dynamic, rapidly
changing threat environment at all levels of conflict by better use of space
systems to support military operations. The key, for the Air Force, is to
put these capabilities in the hands of both the aircrews and the

1-24

commanders. As we gain
in new avionics packages,
exchange, and, to return to
column by bringing space

in sophistication, we can anticipate cost savings
greater accuracy and timeliness of information
Mr. Peters' quote, a resulting "X" in the win
systems into the flight as another wingman.
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